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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In its Opposition Brief, the State of Utah ("State") makes numerous arguments 
that it should not be precluded from recovering its costs in connection with the cleanup of 
gasoline released at a former service station site in Monticello, Utah (the "Site"). Despite 
the State's plea, the issue of which party should pay cleanup costs for the Site is not 
before this Court. The only issue in this appeal remains: when did the State's cost 
allocation claim accrue under the Underground Storage Tank Act ("UST Act")? 
In its opening brief, Marathon advocates two alternative statute of limitations rules 
that are both clear and fair. Under the first rule, the statute of limitations would begin to 
run when the State first incurred costs for investigation and cleanup of the Site. This rule 
is supported by the general rule in Utah that a cause of action accrues upon the last event 
necessary to complete a cause of action. Accordingly, a cost recovery claim accrues 
when the first costs are incurred. 
The second and more directly applicable statute of limitations rule is based on a 
plain reading of the UST Act. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-420(2). Under the plain language 
of the Act, the State's cause of action accrued upon the failure of Brent Redd to clean up 
the Site as required by the State. The State admits that it determined that Brent Redd had 
failed to clean up the Site in the Spring of 1993, well outside the applicable three year 
statute of limitations period. State's Brief at 7. 
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Both of these rules provide private parties and the State with a clear application of 
the statute of limitations and will further the public policy goals of timely site cleanups 
and timely-filed actions for cost allocation and recovery. 
In contrast, the State characterizes its chameleon-like cause of action as whatever 
necessary to both excuse its late filing date and satisfy its need to collect past and future 
damages as stated in its First Amended Complaint, (f 33; R. at 121.) The State has 
attempted to accomplish this by bringing this action under the UST Act and then arguing 
before the trial court first that its claims were like tort claims (trespass/nuisance) and later 
like indemnity claims. Now, at this late date, in a final attempt to preserve its action, the 
State argues its claims should be analogized to restitution or quasi-contract.1 There 
simply is no cause of action that meets these parameters. To accommodate the State's 
arguments would require the creation of an entirely new cause of action outside of the 
UST Act and in direct conflict with Utah law governing statutes of limitations and 
recovery under the UST Act as there is no cause of action under the UST Act or accrual 
principle under the statute of limitations that adequately supports the State's arguments. 
It is a general rule under Utah law that even in cases applying de novo review, this 
Court will "review issues raised for the first time on appeal only if exceptional 
circumstances or plain error exists." Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 n. 1 (Utah 
1996). 
The State's arguments regarding equitable remedies have changed so frequently as to 
preclude Marathon from determining whether these same arguments were presented to 
the District Court or whether they are being raised on appeal for the first time. 
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If the District Court's decision is not reversed, there will be no means to prevent 
surprise litigation and the concordant unfair results from lack of witnesses, documents 
and other evidence that is lost with the passage of time. Under the current ruling, the 
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the state makes a cleanup cost payment. 
The District Court further ruled that "a new cause of action accrues upon each payment 
of cleanup costs." (R. at 816.) Applying the ruling, the State has unfettered discretion as 
to when the statute runs and could choose to let a claim lie dormant for an extended 
period of time without prejudice, despite having knowledge of all information necessary 
for its cause of action. Defendant petitions this Court to apply the statute of limitations 
consistent with the principles of Utah law by ruling that the State's claims are time 
barred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S CLAIM ACCRUED EITHER (1) UPON THE STATE 
INCURRING COSTS OR (2) UPON THE FAILURE OF BRENT REDD TO 
CLEANUP THE SITE AS DEMANDED BY THE STATE IN 1993 
A. The State's Claims are Time-Barred 
The State's cause of action accrued either in early 1995 when it incurred costs by 
initiating cleanup activities or, under a plain reading of the UST Act, in 1993 upon Brent 
Redd's failure to cleanup the Site as the State required. Under Utah law, "as a general 
rule, a cause of action accrues when a plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted an 
action to successful completion." DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 843 
(Utah 1996) (interpreting statute of limitations as applied to securities violations). 
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Indeed, the State's cause of action accrued upon the "happening of the last event 
necessary to complete the cause of action." Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 
1128-29 (Utah 1992) (barring plaintiffs cause of action for failure to file claim within 
one year of event forming basis for cause of action). Despite the State's recent 
obfiiscation of its claims by discussing equitable theories of recovery which the State 
argues only accrue with each payment of cleanup costs, the State is pursuing both past 
and future costs at the Site. Nothing has transpired since early 1995 that had any affect 
on the State's claim for past and future costs related to the Site. If the State's claim for 
all costs was ripe in 1998, it must also have been ripe in early in 1995. 
Here, the undisputed facts show that the State could have first filed and prosecuted 
its action against Marathon as early as March 18, 1993, the date the State informed Brent 
Redd that his failure to cleanup the Site would result in his liability for all funds 
expended by the State in performing its own cleanup of the Site. Moreover, this is not 
2
 Clearly, the State was well aware of its potential claims as early as 1980. The record 
evidence shows that the State first learned of releases of gasoline at the subject gas 
station (the "Site") in 1980. See Deposition of K. Brent Redd, ("Redd Depo."). (R. 902; 
Exhibit 24 at 1.) The State did an investigation and issued a report on the problem in 
1981 which detailed its determination that no further action was immediately necessary, 
however, the report noted that additional cleanup may be required in the future. (See 
Redd Depo., R. 902; Exhibit 24 at 8.) The gas station closed down in 1991 and the State 
was also informed by the Southeastern Utah District Health Department that the tanks 
had leaked. (R. at 515, 542.) The State made repeated requests for Woody's Enterprises 
and Brent Redd, the Site's current and prior owners and operators, to clean up the Site. 
(R. at 521-40.) Woody's Enterprises and Brent Redd failed to do so despite the State's 
repeated requests and demands. (R. at 542-43.) By March 18, 1993, the State 
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the only potential accrual date for the State's cause of action—this event is highlighted 
because it demonstrates that the State was aware that it would need to sue Brent Redd for 
his failure to perform the required cleanup under the UST Act. Other potential accrual 
dates include: (1) Brent Redd's informing the State that he did not intend to cleanup the 
Site; (2) the State deciding to perform its own cleanup; (3) the State obtaining funding for 
the cleanup; (4) State contractors commencing cleanup at the site; (5) State contractors 
invoicing the State for cleanup at the site; (6) expenditure of State funds at the site; (7) 
State approval of contractor invoices for site cleanup; or (8) the State's first payment of 
contractor invoices. See Exhibit 1, Marathon's Opening Brief The State has offered no 
specific arguments opposing any of the possible accrual dates listed in Exhibit 1. In fact, 
even giving the State the benefit of selecting the most charitable possible date, the State 
should have filed its action by June 21, 1998, three years after it paid the first contractor 
invoice for the Site clean up. The State, however, waited until September 16, 1998, well 
after the applicable three-year statute of limitations had expired under any accrual theory 
applicable to a cause of action allowing recovery for both past and future damages. 
B. The State has Ignored Marathon's Plain Reading of the UST Act 
under which the State's Claims are Time Barred after March 18,1996 
In its opening brief, Marathon extensively argues that the plain language of the 
Act establishes the date of Brent Redd's failure to clean up the site as an accrual date for 
determined that Brent Redd was unable or unwilling to take the abatement, investigative 
and corrective action required by the UST Act. (R. at 462.) The State began to clean up 
the Site with its own funds by early 1995. (R. at 553.) 
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the statute of limitations. Marathon's Opening Brief at 23-27. In fact, Marathon 
highlighted the argument by identifying it as one of the two most defensible accrual dates 
presented to this Court. Marathon's Opening Brief at 6. This was also one of Marathon's 
primary arguments to the lower court. 
Remarkably, the State is entirely silent as to this argument. Under Marathon's 
analysis, and according to the State's own admission, the State advised Brent Redd that 
his "failure to comply with the UST Act would result in liability under the UST Act" on 
March 18, 1993. (R. at 542-544.) Therefore, under this analysis, the statute of 
limitations terminated the State's claims on March 18, 1996, more than two years prior to 
the State filing its complaint. 
The plain reading of the UST Act provides an easily determined accrual date 
proximate to the time that gasoline leaks become known to the State and private parties. 
The advantages of such an interpretation of the statute of limitations are two-fold. First, 
prompt action will be taken when gasoline leaks are detected. Second, there is no need to 
reach complex issues regarding whether every payment is its own cause of action and 
whether the State can file a claim for causes of action that have not yet accrued. 
IL IN ITS COMPLAINT, THE STATE HAS CHOSEN RELIEF 
INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS CURRENT ARGUMENTS 
This Court can look to the language of a Complaint to determine the nature of a 
lawsuit. See e ^ Parker v. Rolfson, 525 P.2d 612 (Utah 1974). 
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On September 16, 1998, the State filed its Complaint. That Complaint contained 
one cause of action, which sought damages only under the UST Act. (R. at 1-7.) In May, 
1999, the State filed an Amended Complaint (R. at 115-123.) which again sought 
damages only under the UST Act. 
A. The State Seeks Future Damages 
In both its Complaint and its Amended Complaint, the State seeks past and future 
damages. (R. at 121.) The State's decision to seek future damages is incompatible with 
its primary argument and demonstrates the trial court's error. 
In order to seek future damages, the State must acknowledge that their statutory 
cause of action is ripe and that all the elements of their claim are present. Yet, its primary 
argument to preserve its claims is that each "cost" is its own cause of action and is not 
ripe until it is actually spent. Thus, in order for the Court to grant the future relief that the 
State seeks, the Court must apply the accrual theory that Marathon advocates, that all 
costs accrue on the date that the State first incurred costs. 
B. The State Did Not Plead Equitable Indemnity, Quasi-Contract, 
Restitution or any Other Equitable Relief 
Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint includes a cause of action or 
seeks damages for indemnification, trespass, nuisance, restitution or quasi-contract. 
Regardless of this fact, the State makes extensive use of cases based on these causes of 
action. The State analogizes its claim under the UST Act to common law claims based 
upon these theories to such an extent it is difficult to recognize the State's statutory claim 
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as it was set forth in the Amended Complaint. The State cannot survive the statute of 
limitations by simply recharacterizing what is expressly pled in both its Complaint and 
Amended Complaint. A plaintiff is not permitted to recharacterize its claims to avoid the 
bar of the statute of limitations. See DOIT, Inc., 926 P.2d at 842 n. 13 (citing Malone v. 
University of Kansas Medical Or., 552 P.2d 885, 889 (Kan. 1976)). 
III. THE STATE IS BOUND BY STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS JUST AS 
ANY OTHER PRIVATE PARTY—THERE IS NO BASIS FOR 
DISTINGUISHING THE STATE'S CLAIM FROM PRIVATE PARTY 
COST RECOVERY ACTIONS 
The State admits that it is bound to the three-year statute of limitation applicable to 
cost-allocation actions under the UST Act. State's Brief at 3. However, the State argues 
that the date upon which the three year statute accrues should be determined differently 
than the date for a private party because the State, unlike a private party, has no property 
interest in the Site. Remarkably, the State provides no support for its assertion. 
The State alleges that it deserves special treatment3 because it is entitled to bring a 
statutory cost recovery action, whereas all other parties are limited to an action for 
3
 In direct contrast to the State's claim that it deserves a special accrual date under the 
Utah Statute of Limitations, the Minnesota District Court treated the State of Minnesota 
the same as a private party and, as a result, barred all of its claims related to pollution at a 
privately owned site. Minnesota v. Employers Ins. Co., No. MC 00-001819, slip op. at 6-
7 (Sept. 5, 2001) (attached as Exhibit A). The court relied on Union Pacific R. Co. v. 
Reilly Industries, Inc., F.Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1998) affd, 215 F.3d 830 (8th Cir. 
2000), and granted summary judgment for defendants on the grounds that the State of 
Minnesota was aware of contamination at the subject sites outside of the applicable 
statute of limitations period. The court made no special exceptions or distinctions 
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contribution. Notwithstanding the State's failure to provide any legal authority that the 
difference between a cost recovery right and a contribution right is of any moment, the 
State's bald statement actually supports Marathon's statute of limitations arguments. As 
the State has highlighted in the UST Act, a private party may pursue a contribution claim 
for costs incurred in excess of its liability. See Utah Code Ann, § 19-6-424.5(6)(a). 
However, claim for contribution cannot be brought until a private party is required to pay 
costs in excess of its liability. Therefore, if the State waits eight years or more to initiate 
a proceeding wherein the liability of the parties is determined, any claim for contribution 
will be correspondingly delayed. 
This problem is further exacerbated by the potential for additional litigation as the 
State seeks to recover costs incurred after the initial lawsuit—consistent with the District 
Court's ruling that the State has a new cause of action each time it pays for cleanup at the 
Site. Accordingly, the State is in a much better position than any private party to pursue 
its claims and its cause of action actually accrues earlier, as all private contribution 
between the State of Minnesota and any private party with a property interest in the site. 
The court held that the remedies available were similar in nature to statutory and common 
law remedies for damage to real property. Accordingly, the cause of action accrued upon 
discovery of contamination on the property, regardless of whether it was the government 
or a private party seeking cost recovery. 
This decision is persuasive in that the UST Act is very similar to the Minnesota statute. 
Marathon provided an extensive analysis of Union Pacific R. Co. in its opening brief and 
highlighted the similarities of the cost recovery provisions of the UST Act and the 
Minnesota cleanup statute. Marathon's Opening Brief at 16-17. 
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actions are contingent on the State's claims.4 Delay by the State could push contribution 
actions so far into the future that little evidence would be available for allocation of 
cleanup costs in a contribution action, 
IV. THE STATE SEEKS TO PRESERVE ITS CLAIM BY EXTENDING 
INDEFINITELY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS USING 
CONFLICTING LEGAL THEORIES THAT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
UTAH LAW AND UNRELATED TO THE ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS 
CASE 
The State has cobbled together a mix of equitable theories in an effort to preserve 
its claim under the only theory available—that each payment of response costs by the 
State constitutes a new cause of action. There is no single legal theory that supports the 
State's argument. Rather, the State has blended various legal doctrines and attempted to 
support its legal theory that it has a new cause of action with each payment. A review of 
these arguments demonstrates their inapplicability. 
A. The State's Claim is Based in Law, Not Equity and Therefore is not 
Exempt from the Statute of Limitations Based on Equitable Theories of 
Recovery 
The State erroneously asserts that its claim is based on the equitable principles of 
restitution and indemnity, arguing that a new cause of action arises with each new 
4
 The State's assertion that private party contribution actions should be treated differently 
than government cost recovery actions for statute of limitations purposes also creates 
potentially disparate results. If one party pays greater than its share of liability, it could 
be time barred from recovery of costs in excess of its liability, while the State is not. 
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payment of costs related to the Site. However, when the State drafted its complaint, it 
chose to pursue a statutory claim that is based entirely on law, not equity. (R. at 120-21.) 
Additionally, this Court has consistently refused to apply equitable principles to 
actions based on statute. See Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't of Corrections, 942 
P.2d 933, 940-41 (Utah 1997) (holding that equitable defenses do not apply to an action 
brought under statutory authority of the Utah Administrative Procedure Act to enforce an 
administrative order); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 845-46 (Utah 
1996) (distinguishing cases where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief from claims based in 
law and holding that the application of the equitable doctrine of laches is incorrect). If 
equitable defenses are not applicable to claims based in law, it is equally inappropriate to 
allow the resurrection of stale statutory claims on equitable grounds when they are 
otherwise barred by the statute of limitations. 
B. Even if the State was Entitled to Recovery Under a Quasi-Contractual 
Theory, Its Claim Would still be Time-Barred under Utah Law 
Even assuming arguendo that cost allocation and recovery actions are founded on 
principles of contract, this Court has held that claims under a contract ordinarily accrue at 
the time of breach. Upland Indus. Corp. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 684 P.2d 638, 
643 (Utah 1984). Claims based on quasi-contract are subject to the same statute of 
limitations principles as oral contracts. See CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Hill, 824 F. Supp. 
1532, 1546 (D. Utah 1993) (citing Petty & Riddle, Inc. v. Lunt 138 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah 
1942). "The plaintiff cannot ask the law to make and impose a contract and then seek to 
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avoid the applicable statutory bars." T&S Investment Co. v. Coury, 593 P.2d 503, 505 
(Okla. 1979) (holding that quasi-contractual cause of action was time barred by statute of 
limitations applicable to express or implied contracts). 
The breach in this case occurred as soon as the State determined that Brent Redd 
and Woody's Enterprises were unable or unwilling to cleanup the property under the 
UST Act. All subsequent actions taken by the State, as well as the costs that the State has 
incurred, are all related to damages but do not provide any additional facts necessary for 
the State's claim based on the breach of contractual or quasi-contractual obligations to 
clean up the Site. Any claim by the State that such a cause of action does not accrue until 
the cleanup is paid for is meritless. This Court has recognized in some contract cases, 
although damages may not be measurable until several years after the purported breach, a 
plaintiff can still be required to file a timely suit with respect to the breach and then 
request the trial court to stay proceedings pending the solidification of damages. See S & 
G Inc. v. Intermountain Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735, 741 n.6 (Utah 1996). 
Additionally, the State's ability to sue for future response costs has not proven to be a 
problem in other environmental cases. See Utah Dept. of Envtl. Quality v. Wind River 
Petroleum, 881 P.2d 869, 875 (Utah 1999) (allowing costs to accrue during course of 
litigation). 
Thus, even under the State's misplaced notion that there may be a quasi-contract 
in this case, the State should have filed this action within three years of when it believed 
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Brent Redd breached the obligation by failing to cleanup the Site. Prompt filing in this 
manner would have allowed the parties to discuss alternative cleanup plans prior to 
initiation of cleanup by the State and, if necessary, discovery could have been conducted 
when witnesses were alive, memories were fresher and documents were available. 
C. The State's Equitable Indemnity Argument Does Not Apply Because 
the State is Not Seeking Reimbursement for a Separate Underlying 
Liability 
The State's effort to characterize its claim as a common law indemnity action is 
equally misplaced for a variety of reasons. First, there is no separate underlying claim 
involving an unrelated third party as exists in indemnity actions. Second, there has been 
no delay while the State's liability to a third party was determined, for which the State 
would ultimately seek reimbursement from Marathon. Third, there is no party which is 
legally obligated to pay for the damages suffered by a victim whose injuries are entirely 
attributable to the wrongdoing of a third party tortfeasor. 
In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), this Court 
set forth the elements required in an indemnity action under Utah law, 
In actions for indemnity, courts universally require proof of 
three elements: (1) the payor (prospective indemnitee) must 
discharge a legal obligation the payor owes to a third person; 
(2) the prospective indemnitor must also be liable to the third 
person; and (3) as between the claimant payor and the 
prospective indemnitor, the obligation ought to be discharged 
by the indemnitor. 
Perry, 681 P.2d at 218 (rejecting indemnification action brought by subcontractor against 
supplier after subcontractor was sued by general contractor) (citing Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. v. 
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Indian Head Cattle Co., 627 P.2d 469, 475 (Or. 1981); see also, Salt Lake City School 
District v. Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P.2d 284, 287 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding that 
employer was entitled to indemnification from insurance advisor for amounts paid in 
settlement of claim based on insurance advisor's malpractice). A simple comparison of 
these elements to the State's claim against Marathon shows that an indemnitor— 
indemnitee relationship does not exist. The three fundamental differences between a 
common law indemnity action and the State's action for cost allocation pursuant to the 
UST Act follow in detail. 
First, the State has not discharged a legal obligation on behalf of Marathon that it 
owed to a third person. See Perry, 681 P.2d at 218. Under the UST Act, the State itself, 
rather than a third party as exists in an indemnity case, has complete discretion in 
determining the costs and timing of both the underlying cleanup and the cost allocation 
action. This discretion as to the type of remedy and thus the amount of expenses incurred 
is not indicative of indemnity actions. In the instant case, the State was informed of a 
petroleum leak from a tank and seven years later it elected to clean up the Site and 
attempt to recover and allocate costs under the UST Act. Thus, the cause of action for 
reimbursement upon violation of the UST Act does not reflect the two-part process of the 
indemnity scenario. If the State can avoid the statute of limitations by masquerading its 
claim as a common law indemnification, it appears that almost any type of claim, based 
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in tort, contract, or statute can make an end run around the statute of limitations using a 
similar argument. 
Second, the action for common law indemnity is an equitable remedy "wholly 
distinct from the underlying [cause of] action which gave rise to the right of indemnity." 
Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv. Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). 
Therefore, "[a] common-law indemnity action does not arise when the underlying 
damage occurs; rather, a it runs from the time of the payment of the underlying claim or 
the payment of a judgment or a settlement." Id. In this case, however, the State's 
reimbursement claim under the UST Act is inextricably intertwined with the underlying 
claim of liability. This is because it is all part of the same cause of action and forms the 
basis for the State's claim. 
Third, the State was under no legal obligation to incur cleanup costs and had an 
alternative administrative remedy readily available. If the State decided to do nothing at 
the Site it would not be liable to any party for conditions at the Site. The State could 
have ordered the Site owner to cleanup the Site pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
420(2). Instead, the State chose to cleanup the Site itself. Moreover, the State's control 
over the timing and nature of this cause of action is underscored by the fact that it could 
have tolled the statute of limitations by simply ordering the Site owner to perform the 
cleanup and initiating an enforcement proceeding if the Site owner failed to perform the 
cleanup. See Utah Code Ann. § 19-1-305 (1991). 
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In sum, the differences between the State's cause of action and the elements of an 
action for equitable indemnification are numerous and significant. 
D. The State's Attempt to Analogize its Claim to Equitable 
Reimbursement is Misplaced 
In its attempt to find an alternate theory that preserves its claim, the State argues 
that an action for equitable reimbursement or equitable restitution accrues "when the 
claimed overpayment is made." State's Brief at 18. This argument is unhelpful in 
deciding the issue before this Court. Equitable restitution or reimbursement requires that 
a defendant give back money that it had received from a plaintiff. See CIG Exploration, 
Inc. v. Utah, 2001 UT 37, 24 P.3d 966 (applying equitable reimbursement to 
overpayment of royalties); Morris v. Sykes, 624 P.2d 681 (Utah 1981) (applying 
restitution to forfeiture of payments for purchase of land). 
Here, the State's claim is based upon the cleanup of gasoline released from storage 
tanks. In equitable reimbursement cases the entire cause of action is based upon the prior 
payment of money from one party to another, rather than the costs associated with paying 
third parties to address a separate injury. Marathon has not received any money from the 
State. Therefore, the State does not have a claim for equitable reimbursement. 
Accordingly, cases based on equitable reimbursement or restitution are inapplicable to 
the issue before this Court. 
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E- The State's First Amended Complaint Expressly Seeks to Recover 
Costs from the PST Fund, which are Subrogated According to the UST 
Act Placing the State in the Same Position as a Private Party 
In its opening brief, Marathon argues that the notion of subrogation applies 
because of the manner in which the State pled its case. In its brief, the State's only 
argument that its cost recovery claim is not rooted in subrogation is that the State is not 
seeking cost recovery for a release covered under the PST Fund. State's Brief at 20. The 
State is incorrect. 
In paragraph 30 of the State's First Amended Complaint, as pointed out in 
Marathon's opening brief (and to the District Court below), the State seeks "funds from 
the Petroleum Storage Tank ("PST") Fund which was created by Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-
409." (R. at 120.) The UST Act expressly states that "if any payment is made under this 
part, the [Petroleum Storage Tank Trust] fund shall be subrogated to all the responsible 
parties' rights of recovery against any person or organization . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 19-
6-426(7) (1988). This statute places the State in the shoes of a private party seeking to 
recover costs incurred cleaning up the Site. Thus, the State is subject to the same statute 
of limitations principles as any other private party. 
V. THE STATE RELIES UPON FEDERAL CASES WHICH DO NOT APPLY 
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act ("CERCLA") Cases Are Inapplicable 
The State's reliance on CERCLA case law is misplaced. As the State has noted in 
its brief, the UST Act is a federally delegated program that is part of the Resource 
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Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 6991a. RCRA is 
fundamentally different than CERCLA in its scope and purpose. "RCRA is a 
comprehensive statute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and 
hazardous waste. Unlike [CERCLA], RCRA is not principally designed to effectuate the 
cleanup of toxic waste sites or to compensate those who have attended to the remediation 
of environmental hazards." Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996). 
CERCLA contains very detailed liability provisions and statutes of limitations 
restrictions.5 These provisions provide explicit details on when a cause of action accrues 
5
 CERCLA's statute of limitations provisions are as follows: 
(2) Actions for recovery of costs 
An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in section 9607 of 
this title must be commenced— 
(A) for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal 
action, except that such cost recovery action must be brought within 6 
years after a determination to grant a waiver under section 
9604(c)(1)(C) of this title for continued response action; and 
(B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-
site construction of the remedial action, except that, if the remedial 
action is initiated within 3 years after the completion of the removal 
action, costs incurred in the removal action may be recovered in the cost 
recovery action brought under this subparagraph. 
In any such action described in this subsection, the court shall enter a 
declaratory judgment on liability for response costs or damages that will 
be binding on any subsequent action or actions to recover further response 
costs or damages. A subsequent action or actions under section 9607 of 
this title for further response costs at the vessel or facility may be 
maintained at any time during the response action, but must be 
commenced no later than 3 years after the date of completion of all 
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and the applicable statute of limitations in each case. These provisions are inapplicable 
to cases not filed under CERCLA. 
If UST Act claims are meant to follow the same statutes of limitations accrual 
principles as CERCLA claims, such language could have easily been included in RCRA 
or the UST Act. No such language exists. The mere fact that both statutes relate to 
environmental matters and contain cleanup provisions does not justify distorting an 
action based on a RCRA delegated statute to fit CERCLA case law. 
B. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Cases Are Inapplicable 
In its continuing attempt to avoid the statute of limitations by characterizing its 
claim as equitable relief, the State improperly relies on several Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act ("Clean Water Act") cases. Notwithstanding the fact that this Court has 
expressly rejected imposing equitable principles on claims based in law, these cases are 
inapplicable to the question before this Court. 
Two of the cases relied upon by the State are based solely on equitable restitution 
because there was no statutory basis for cost recovery. In Wyandotte Trans. Co. v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204-05 (1967) the Supreme Court held that the United States 
had an equitable right of restitution for costs associated with removing sunken vessels. 
response action. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, an action 
may be commenced under section 9607 of this title for recovery of costs at 
any time after such costs have been incurred. 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2). 
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The Clean Water Act provided the United States with authority to remove sunken vessels 
from navigable waters, however, it did not provide a means of cost recovery within the 
statute.6 Likewise, in United States v. Boyd, 520 F.2d 642, 644-45 (6th Cir. 1975), the 
court held that the United States could pursue cost recovery under a theory of restitution 
to recover its costs for removing a sunken barge. 
The application of equitable principles in these cases was necessitated only by the 
lack of statutory cost recovery authority under the applicable sections of the Clean Water 
Act. However, the State is not in such a situation. The UST Act provides a clear 
statutory basis for cost recovery and Utah law does not blend equitable principles with 
actions based in law. Career Serv. Review Bd., 942 P.2d at 940-41. The State's 
arguments that its statutory cause of action is based on equitable principles and should 
therefore be treated as a restitution claim because the State is authorized to perform 
cleanup work and recover its costs ignore Utah law. Accordingly, it would not be 
necessary or correct to base the State's statutory cost allocation claim on equitable 
restitution grounds and allow the State to avoid any practical limits how late it in can file 
an action. 
The remaining Clean Water Act cases are based on a cost recovery statute. These 
cost recovery actions were brought by the United States for recovery of response costs for 
6
 The Clean Water Act was subsequently amended in 1986 to add a cost recovery 
component to 33 U.S.C. § 414. See Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-662, § 939, 100 Stat. 4082, 4199 (33 U.S.C. § § 414 and 415). 
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the short-term cleanup of oil spills. See United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364 
(5th Cir. 1985) (deciding whether statute of limitations prevented recovery of costs 
relating to response actions for three different oil spills which were performed between 
October 31, 1977 and November 9, 1977; January 28, 1979 and February 3, 1979; and 
September 26, 19776 and October 7, 1976 respectively); and United States v. Dae Rim 
Fishery Co., Ltd., 794 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1985) (deciding whether cleanup costs for 
response actions performed between March 8 and March 20, 1981 were time barred). 
These cases are factually inapplicable for a number of reasons. 
First, the Clean Water Act cases deal with cleanups of oil spills that were 
completely cleaned up within a matter of days or weeks immediately after the oil was 
spilled. In the State's case, actual cleanup at the Site was not initiated by the State until 
over 8 years after the gasoline was reported to have leaked out of the tanks.7 After two 
years of sporadic cleanup efforts the end of the cleanup at the Site is still not in sight. 
Accordingly, the quasi-contract theory used in the Clean Water Act cases does not apply 
to the State's claim under the UST Act because the claim would not have even accrued 
yet. 
Second, recovery under the theory of quasi-contract is only possible under the 
Clean Water Act if the cleanup is already completed. "[T]he cause of action for 
As the Record indicates, the state was actually aware of gasoline leaks at the Site since 
1980. (R. 902; Exhibit 24 at 1.) 
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recouping expenses under the [Clean Water Act] does not accrue until the government 
completes its clean-up operations." Dae Rim Fishery, 794 F.2d at 1395. The State has 
chosen to file the cost recovery claim long before cleanup was complete, yet the State 
now seeks to avoid the statute of limitations under case law that clearly states that the 
State's cause of action is still premature. It appears that the State's chosen remedy in this 
case does not match the case law it is using as a foundation for its cause of action. 
Finally, the use of a quasi-contract theory of recovery in the Clean Water Act 
cases makes more sense in the federal context considering the lack of a federal statute of 
limitations for actions based on statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415(a) & (b). If the 
government's claims under the Clean Water Act were not characterized as quasi-
contractual, there would be no statute of limitations whatsoever. This type of analysis is 
not necessary in Utah, however, as Utah has a clear statute of limitations for "liability 
created by the statutes of this state . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-R-26(4). Therefore, there 
is no need to distort the State's claim to make it into a contractual cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth above, Marathon respectfully requests that this 
Court apply the statute of limitations in a manner consistent with the principles of Utah 
law and rule that the State's claims are time barred. 
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J. MICHAEL BAILEY 
RICHARD J. ANGELL 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Marathon Oil Company 
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J* Cffcaf Ccal of A^oli dxhjcd to ddrai ii nxn tl< iuw of 4« uxrcjj itwdi^ /or HBLA e«t rnvnrv 
' CVtj'U tbt tJtv irJ ^t^uivtxtj <k*ule»-» « A» iromj jrx Vy }>c F«Toi! Diirtci Oo< w«T lU Ojk OnJi 
Ccoia'Apcxtii tiuCoGrtK«rtjiAi^^^»uJti^ctrr>uiijnjf»eW^y(hc<C!xrt. T>u O n bdicvcJ 0»i il 
« t^!dl« srxh lika'01 &t xcnjIiiK (wo«/»tar»TTyjct}ooJ »b<Cu i i *iro ort-«I:i ccc*avrtin» ofi 
rrp-cx I:5MII iflituud rbcCo-jrt^/Vti tbi vcniMoicut unftiity Mlttl ihi wrwigfKlXLAcMiruon7 
Lvxi u ^povei to ilJ BTXI of iiiaju ncrrwi; rn:ra p<rv£iJ bfjry. <lf Jth « diicwi. D«iplic tioc raffYwcJ. 
lie Cc-'i bf)!no lb* dciiecri on PJI IUW by i>< Uiffti OjtiaCoun ud be lijKCireurtCcxi o( Ajyuli u 
»ill u & otia t c i raciirrt lijiM hi, bhii 0 tu cue 
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